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COLORADO WATER COURTS: WHERE ARE THEY?
By
The Honorable Jonathan W. Hays
I.    Scope and Purpose
This presentation will explore current decisions and practices in the Colorado Water Courts.  The
purpose of the presentation is to outline the nature of the claims and issues that are at the
forefront of present litigation.  The presentation will describe the various means of resolving
disputes, including actual litigation, omnibus agreements among users with mutual interests, and
private agreements between opposers and applicants.
A.  Nontributary Rights.   Litigation has evolved away from  disputes over the character of an
aquifer as tributary or nontributary, and necessity of augmenting aquifer withdrawals.  Present
litigation centers on the use of aquifers as storage vessels.  The principal focus is upon the Denver
Basin aquifers.
1. Historical Background. 
a) Time immemorial to 1969. Water arising from springs, but not reaching a stream,
is recognized as nontributary.  Bruening v. Dorr, 23 Colo. 195 (1896).  
Nontributary water held not subject to call by senior appropriators.  Ripley v. Park
Center Land & Water Co., 40 Colo. 129 (1907).  All groundwater is presumed to
be tributary, and Colorado law held not to apply to nontributary groundwater. 
Safranek v. Limon, 123 Colo. 330 (1951).  Nontributary groundwater held to be
not subject to appropriation.  Whitten v. Coit, 153 Colo.157 (1963).  The
Groundwater Management Act of 1965 creates a commission to designate
groundwater basins, and requires well permits from the State Engineer for out-of-
basin wells.
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b) 1969 to the present.  The Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 
1969 (the “Act”) enacts the basic current statutory scheme. 
c) In 1973, S.B. 213 [now, § 37-90-137(4)] allocated nontributary water on the basis
of overlying land ownership.  Hall v. Kuiper, 181 Colo. 130 (1973) held that
underground flow that would reach the stream in 40 years, was tributary to the
stream.
d) In 1975, Kuiper v. Lundvall, 187 Colo. 40, concluded that water that did not reach
the stream system in 100 years was nontributary, and in 1979 the basis for
nontributariness was changed from the question of how long it took water to reach
the stream system, to how long it took for pumping to affect the stream system. 
District 10 Water Users Asso. v. Barnett, 198 Colo. 291 (1979).
e) In 1983, Colorado v. Southwestern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 671 P.2d
1294 (1983) [Huston II] concluded that nontributary groundwater was not subject
to appropriation, and was not subject to adjudication under the Act.  Huston II
essentially overruled Ft. Lyon Canal v. Perdue, 184 Colo. 219 (1974), which had
concluded that nontributary water issues were “water matters” within the meaning
of the 1969 Act.  Following the Huston II decision, the legislature enacted S.B.
439 [now, § 37-90-137(6)] in 1983, overruling Huston II and conferring
jurisdiction over nontributary water upon the water courts.
During the period 1951 to 1983, water litigation centered on whether the courts
had jurisdiction to determine nontributary rights, and if so, what did “nontributary”
mean.
f)  In 1985, S.B. 5 [now, § 37-90-103 (10.5)] defined the term “nontributary
groundwater”, refining the 100-year rule and applying special augmentation rules
to the Denver Basin aquifers.  Eleven years later, in 1996, S.B. 74 [now, § 37-90-
3
103 (10.7)] defined not nontributary groundwater, in essence, as groundwater
within the Denver Basin aquifers that is tributary, but which is to be administered
under the Denver Basin rules rather than the prior appropriation doctrine.  From
1985 to 1992, litigation centered on issues regarding the nature of sufficient
resume notice, e.g., Danielson v. Jones, 698 P.2d 240 (1985) and Monaghan
Farms v. Denver, 807 P.2d 9 (Colo. 1991). 
2. The Denver Basin Aquifers. 
As required by § 37-90-137(9), the State Engineer promulgated rules for administering
the Denver Basin aquifers.  As part of the legislative mandate, the State Engineer
determined the characteristics of each of these aquifers, including the boundaries of the
nontributary and not nontributary portions of each aquifer.  These regulations and
associated presumptive aquifer characteristics, constitute The Denver Basin Rules, and
were effective as of December 30, 1985.
a) Aquifer characteristics.   The four aquifers, the Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe and
Laramie-Fox Hills formations, are superimposed, cover an area of about 6700
square miles, and contain an estimated 250,000,000 acre feet of water.  They
frequently outcrop along their perimeters, underlying active stream beds in some
locations, producing artesian springs in others.  Increased pumping over the past
quarter century has lowered the artesian head, so that fewer springs exist today. 
They range in maximum thickness from  350’ for the Laramie-Hills aquifer to
1200’  for the Dawson aquifer, and in maximum depth below ground surface to the
bottom of the aquifer from about 1000’ for the Dawson aquifer to about 3500’ for
the Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer. The amount of water, as a percentage of total
aquifer volume, that can be physically withdrawn is about 17% for each of the four
aquifers.  Litigation involving these aquifers has focussed on augmentation of post-
pumping depletions, and adjustment of aquifer boundaries.
4
b)  Post-pumping depletions.   Decrees for not nontributary water require
replacement of 4% of water pumped from wells that are more than one mile from
the closest contact of the aquifer to the stream. § 37-90-137 (9)(c) also requires
continuation of replacement of water, after pumping has ceased, to augment
injurious stream depletions that occur thereafter.   Danielson v. Castle Meadows,
791 P.2d 1106 (Colo. 1990) [Castle Meadows I], represents the first litigation of
issues regarding augmentation of depletions that result from withdrawal of not
nontributary water.  The litigation continued with State Engineer v. Castle
Meadows, 856 P.2d 496 (Colo. 1993) [Castle Meadows II], and Simpson v. Yale
Investments, 886 P.2d 889 (Colo. 1994) [Castle Meadows III].
c) Aquifer boundaries.  The Denver Basin Rules establish aquifer boundaries that
define the demarcation between the nontributary and not nontributary portions of
each of the Denver Basin aquifers, as well as boundaries that define their
geological extent.   Until § 37-90-103 (10.5) was amended in 1996, the character
of a Denver Basin aquifer would be transformed from not nontributary to
nontributary, once the water level in the aquifer fell below the base of the stream
alluvium, so as to sever its hydrologic connection with the stream system.  This
was so, because once the connection was severed, withdrawal of water from the
aquifer no longer affected the stream system; stream depletion then became
constant, and was unaffected by the water level in the aquifer, no matter how far
below the aquifer-stream contact the water level fell. § 37-90-103 (10.5) now
provides that not nontributary water shall not become tributary solely because
pumping from the aquifer has lowered the hydrostatic pressure in the aquifer below
the stream alluvium.
B. Tributary Rights. 
1.  Historical Background.  Litigation has evolved from disputes concerning the legal
rights to divert, and to change place and type of use, to disputes over applications for
conditional decrees, findings of diligence and abandonment.
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a) Pre-1969.  Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch, 6 Colo. 443 (1882) recognized the prior
appropriation doctrine and rejected the doctrine of riparian rights.  Coffin also held
that the extent of a water right was limited to the amount beneficially used. 
Strickler v. Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61 (1891) extended the right of senior
diverter to place a call, not only upon the stream from which he took his water, but
upon its upstream tributaries, as well.   The existence of conditional rights was
recognized in Sieber v. Frink, 7 Colo. 148 (1884).   The necessity of adjudicating
changes in points of diversion was established by New Cache La Poudre Irr. Co. v.
Arthur Irr. Co., 37 Colo. 530 (1906), and the right to condemn rights of way for
the exercise of water rights was held to include pipelines in Lyons v. Longmont, 54
Colo. 112 (1913).  There was relative peace and quiet, in water litigation that
established significant legal principles, between 1912 and 1951, when Safranek v.
Limon, 123 Colo. 330 (1951) established the presumption that all groundwater
was tributary to the stream. 
Other pre-1969 cases, which will be addressed later, concerned the relation back of
conditional decrees (the “first step” doctrine), the requirement that a diverter
employ a reasonable means of diversion (a shallow alluvial well cannot command a
minimum stream flow), and a restatement that a vested right is limited to its
maximum utilization, not its maximum diversion (a precursor of the historical
consumptive use doctrine relating to transfers).
b) From the enactment of the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of
1969 (the “Act”), litigation, cases are more easily considered by category than by
chronology.  Among the significant categories are the refinement of the law
relating to conditional rights, historical consumptive use, and water quality.
Conditional Rights.  The concept was recognized in 1883 (Sieber,supra), and the
term “conditional right” was coined in Suffolk Gold Mining & Milling v. San
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Miguel Consolidated Mining & Milling, 9 Colo. App. 407 (1897).  The principle
that a conditional right, once made absolute, related back to the “first step” taken
toward assertion of the conditional right was announced in Denver v. Northern
Colorado Water Conservancy District, 130 Colo. 375 (1954).
The “can and will” doctrine was enacted in 1972, now § 37-92-305 (9)(b).  The
doctrine requires, as an element of a “first step”, that an applicant for a conditional
decree establish that the water rights he seeks can and will be diverted and applied
to a beneficial use, and that his proposed project can and will be completed within
a reasonable time.  This principle was applied in Southeastern Colorado Water
Conservancy District v. Florence, 688 P.2d 715 (Colo. 1984), and reaffirmed in
FWS Land & Cattle Co. v. Colo. Div. of Wildlife, 795 P.2d 837 (Colo. 1990). 
FWS held that an element of the can and will doctrine is proof that the applicant
either owns the land necessary to his project, or can acquire it by condemnation. 
Other elements of the can and will doctrine include a substantial probability the
applicant can appropriate the necessary water within a reasonable time, Board of
County Commissioner, Arapahoe County v. U.S., 891 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1995). 
Sufficient water must be available, in priority, in sufficient quantities, and with
sufficient frequency to enable the applicant to compete his appropriation within a
reasonable time.  Application of Hines Highlands Ltd. Partnership, 929 P.2d 718,
723 (Colo. 1996).  Thornton v. Ft. Collins, 830 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1992) held that
the “first step” in a conditional appropriation requires a concurrence of the
applicant’s intent to appropriate and an overt act by the applicant that is sufficient
to put third parties on notice of the applicant’s intent.   While an applicant’s
speculative future needs are not sufficient to establish that he  can and will put his
water to beneficial use, Thornton v. Bijou Irr. Co., 926 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996)
concluded that a municipality may acquire a conditional right based solely on its
projected future needs.  However, the amount to be appropriated by the
municipality must be consistent with its reasonably anticipated requirements, which
are in turn based upon substantial projections of future growth. Thornton, supra,
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830 P.2d at 39.
Historical Consumptive Use.  The earliest appellate decision regarding prior use
appears to be Westminster v. Church, 167 Colo. 1 (1968), although earlier
litigation of applications for change of use considered whether the change created
an expanded use that would result in injury.  See Farmers Highline Canal &
Reservoir Co. v. Golden, ___ P.2d ___, 1999 WL 167671 (Colo. 1999). 
Westminster defined historical use as the amount of water historically diverted.  
The term “historical consumptive use” was first applied in Danielson v. Kerbs Ag.,
646 P.2d 363 (Colo. 1982). The court therein held that the determination of
whether a decreed use had been expanded must consider not only the amount that
had been historically diverted, but must exclude the amount that historically had
returned to the stream.  Kerbs also held that an appropriator who seeks to change
his right, risks quantification of his historical consumptive use.   Wiebert v. Rothe
Bros., 200 Colo. 310 (1980) held that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar the
court from determining the actual extent of historical use in determining the nature
and extent of a previously decreed water right. The principle was reaffirmed in Orr
v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation District, 753 P.2d 1217 (Colo. 1988). Wiebert
also stated that the right to change diversion was limited to the “duty of water,”
i.e., “that measure of water, which, by careful management and use, without
wastage, is reasonably required to be applied to any given tract of land for such
period of time as may be adequate to produce therefrom a maximum amount of
such crops as ordinarily are grown thereon.” Supra, 200 Colo. at 310.  See also,
Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. Golden, supra 129 Colo. at 584. 
Whatever doubt remained on this issue was dispelled in Williams v. Midway
Ranches P.O.A., 938 P.2d 515 (Colo. 1997), holding that the measure of a water
right is its historical consumptive use.
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Water Quality.  Suffolk Gold Mining & Milling, supra, enjoined the discharge of
 polluted water into the stream system.  This principle was litigated in a variety of
fact situations until 1953, without significant change.  From 1953 to 1973,
legislation was enacted that prohibited stream pollution and created criminal
penalties for doing so.  In 1973, the Colorado Water Quality Control Act 
[WQCA] was enacted, empowering the Water Quality Control Commission to
establish pollution standards that regulated discharges to the stream, and a related
Division that is responsible for issuing permits.  The regulation of discharges to the
stream is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission, § 25-8-202 (7) (a),
and challenges to regulation and enforcement are by judicial review of final agency
action.  E.g., National Wildlife Federation v. Cotter Corp., 655 P.2d 598 (Colo.
1983).  However, the jurisdiction of the Commission is expressly limited.  The
Colorado Water Quality Control Act provides that the act “shall not be interpreted
so as to supersede, abrogate, or impair rights to divert water and apply water to
beneficial uses” under Colo. Const. ART.XVI, §§ 5 and 6; nor shall the act be
“applied so as to cause or result in material injury to water rights”, § 25-8-204 (1).
The water court derives its authority over matters involving water quality from
§§ 37-92-305 (3) and (5), which provide generally that applications for change, for
exchange and for plans of augmentation shall not injuriously affect other vested
users, and that substituted water “shall be of a quality and quantity so as to meet
the requirements for which the water of the senior appropriator has normally been
used.” § 37-92-305 (5). Thus, Colorado has created a dual system of water quality
regulation.  There has been little litigation in the water court, to date, over water
quality issues, Thornton v. Bijou Irr. Co., supra 926 P.2d at 92-92.  Unresolved
issues centering on water quality are framed in pending applications, and will be
addressed below.
C. Currently Pending Issues.   The issues now at the forefront of litigation necessarily arise in
applications that are presently pending in the water courts.  While this presentation will avoid
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discussing the merits of such litigation, it is instructive to identify and examine them for their
potential impact on the direction and nature of future litigation.  The issues are: water quality
jurisdiction; and aquifer recharge and storage.
1.  Water Quality.  The issue of jurisdiction has been raised in 96 CW 145, Application of
Denver.  In that application, Denver seeks an exchange, in which it seeks to take water
from the Strontia Springs outfall in return for water from other downstream sources,
including treated effluent discharges from the Bi-City Wastewater Treatment Plant. 
Denver claims that the WQCA preempts §§ 37-92-305(3) and (5), therefore, any
discharges to the stream that comply with its NPDES permit should be deemed to
meet the water quality needs of other vested users.  Thornton opposes the application,
arguing that the express disclaimers in the WQCA confer exclusive jurisdiction on the
water court to adjudicate water quality issues that arise in water court applications. 
Thornton argues, in essence, that the WQCA limits the Commission’s jurisdiction to
regulating the quality of discharges unrelated to replacement water that is decreed
under the 1969 Act.  Upon the parties’ motions, the Division 1 water court determined
that the Commission had exclusive jurisdiction to establish the maximum level of
pollutants that could be lawfully discharged into the stream system, whether the
discharge was related to the exercise of a decreed water right on not.  The court
further concluded that §§ 37-92-305(3) and (5) empower the court to impose stricter
water quality standards, if a vested user can establish that his water quality needs are
not met  by WQCA standards.  Denver’s application has been set for trial, and the
water court’s ruling will undoubtedly be a subject of any appeal.
In other pending cases, opposers who divert from Clear Creek, above its confluence
with the South Platte River, have objected to any lowering of water quality in the
South Platte that would require them to discharge water of higher quality than they are
now permitted to, in order to maintain existing quality conditions in the reach of the
South Platte below its confluence with Clear Creek. Thornton, supra, 926 P.2d at 92-
93, is persuasive if not dispositive; however, argument remains to be heard.
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2. Aquifer Storage.   In the Application of North Colorado Water Conservancy District,
92 CW 130 B 92 CW 140, the District seeks to capture water, when the river is free,
and store it in a number of reservoirs and an unnamed, shallow aquifer located in Weld
county.  The geographical limits of the aquifer have not yet been determined. 
Although it is presumed to be tributary, the rate of discharge into the stream system, if
any, has not been ascertained.
In the Applications of Park County Sportsmens’ Ranch and Aurora, 96 CW 14, the
applicants seek to capture water, when the river is free, and store it in the South Park
Formation in Park county.  Two major technical issues to be determined are the rate of
aquifer recharge that the applicants can achieve, and the rate of aquifer discharge into
the stream.  Application of these two factors will determine the amount of water
available for withdrawal by the applicants at a given point in time.  A third major issue
is whether operation of the applicants’ storage and recharge plan will impair the water
quality within the aquifer, as well as water quality within the surface system.
D. Dispute Resolution.   The expense of litigation has prompted several means of resolving
issues short of trial.  These methods include private agreements between some, but not all, of
the opposers and the applicant.  Other agreements have been executed by holders of water
rights on a particular reach of the stream system, in which they agree to forbear from
objecting to each others’ change applications, e.g., the “Cosmic Agreement”.   Finally,
agreements between  irrigators, suppliers of substitute and augmentation water, and the State
Engineer under temporary substitute supply plans, permit irrigators on a designated reach of
the South Platte to divert out-of-priority, and insure successful crop yield without injury to
downstream seniors, e.g., GASP.
1. Application of Centennial WSD, 85 CW 415, presents an example of an agreement
between a single opposer and an applicant.  Centennial sought to exchange water from
Chatfield Reservoir in return for effluent discharge, just below the Chatfield dam.  In
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order to insure the quality of water reaching its municipal treatment plant, Thornton
agreed to withdraw its opposition if Centennial agreed to limit its effluent discharges,
depending upon the rate of flow at the Chatfield dam outfall.  While this agreement
avoided a potential water quality dispute, it resurfaced in Application of Consolidated
Mutual Water Company, 93 CW 151 (Con. Mutual).  Con. Mutual sought a similar
exchange of Chatfield water in return for the discharge of downstream effluent. 
Thornton objected, because Con. Mutual’s exchange would frustrate Thornton’s
earlier agreement with Centennial. 
2. The Cosmic Agreement.  This is a detailed 84-page agreement between Coors Brewing
Co. and the cities of Golden, Thornton and Westminster. The signatories have
engaged in long-standing disputes concerning their respective rights on Clear Creek,
and have attempted to put them to rest by this agreement.  An analysis of this
document is a Herculean task, and beyond the scope of this presentation.  Vastly
oversimplified, each party agrees not to litigate either quality or quantity issues, in
over 60 enumerated pending and prospective judicial proceedings.   The agreement
covers diversion and discharges into the Croke Canal, the Farmer’s Highline Canal and
the Church Ditch, as well as discharges to the Standley Lake/Reservoir and the West
Gravel Lakes.  In addition, the agreement covers effluent discharges from Coors’
general wastewater treatment plant and its brewing operations wastewater treatment
plant.  Suffice it to say that interminably complex and protracted litigation has been
avoided by the execution of this agreement.  The only litigation known to this court
has been limited to narrow issues of whether a proposed exchange is covered by the
agreement.
 3. Groundwater Appropriators of the South Platte (“GASP”): a non-profit corporation,
created in May of 1972 to provide augmentation to wells from the upper reaches of
the South Platte River near Fairplay to the Nebraska state line near Julesberg, under a
non-decreed plan that that operates under the authority of the State Engineer’s
Substitute Supply Plan provision.   GASP has three primary replacement water
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sources: recharge ponds, direct wells, and reservoir and ditch company rights.  In
1998, GASP provided 85,000 acre-feet to replace the depletions of 3,200 wells that
pump out-of-priority.  Annual fees to members are based on the amount of water that
a well owner pumps during the year, in additional to an initial start-up fee.  GASP
offers a variety of contracts to the members based on their well use:  pre-1969
irrigation wells; pre-1969 wells with expanded uses; wells with adequate
accompanying surface water to cover depletions, but without a decreed plan for
augmentation or substitute supply plan; and individual contracts to cover multi-well
complex cases.
4. Central Colorado Water Conservancy District (“Central”) formed in 1965 by public
petition and vote pursuant to the 1937 Water Conservancy Act.  Central serves
portions of Adams, Morgan, and Weld Counties.  In 1973, the Groundwater
Management Subdistrict (“Subdistrict”) was formed to administer the augmentation of
wells.  The Subdistrict contains over 300 square miles and augments over 1,000 wells,
also under the authority of the State Engineer’s substitute supply provision.  Central’s
member wells have an annual depletion of approximately 74, 000 acre-feet, which
translates into 24,000 acre-feet of replacement water being introduced into the system,
April to October, from supplies such as senior surface water rights owned by the
Subdistrict, leased surface water rights, water pumped from well fields, recharge
projects, and lined gravel pit storage reservoirs.  The annual assessment is figured
differently than GASP as it is based on the consumptive use of each individual
petitioner, rather than acre-feet pumped, and the type of use irrigation, non-irrigation,
or municipal. The Board of Directors for Central adopted a policy on November 15,
1994 requiring new water allotment contract petitioners to either purchase or lease
adequate surface water to cover the depletions caused by the pumping of their wells as
a prerequisite to acceptance to Central Augmentation Plan.
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E. Summary. 
Emerging issues in groundwater litigation center upon the use of aquifers for storage.   The
principal concerns are computation of the amount of stored water available for withdrawal, and
the impact on the quality of aquifer water that may result from artificial recharge.
The principal current issue in surface water litigation is the effect of use transfers and exchanges
upon stream water quality.  The issue of the water court’s jurisdiction to require stricter quality
standards for replacement water, than is required by water quality regulations, remains unresolved
at this time.
Parties to water litigation will continue to rely on private agreements in order to reduce the
complexity, cost, and consumption of time associated with water trials.
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